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Abstract
Artificially intelligent systems, given a set of non-trivial
ethical rules to follow, will inevitably be faced with
scenarios which call into question the scope of those
rules. In such cases, human reasoners typically will en-
gage in interpretive reasoning, where interpretive argu-
ments are used to support or attack claims that some
rule should be understood a certain way. Artificially in-
telligent reasoners, however, currently lack the ability to
carry out human-like interpretive reasoning, and we ar-
gue that bridging this gulf is of tremendous importance
to human-centered AI. In order to better understand how
future artificial reasoners capable of human-like inter-
pretive reasoning must be developed, we have collected
a dataset of ethical rules, scenarios designed to invoke
interpretive reasoning, and interpretations of those sce-
narios. We perform a qualitative analysis of our dataset,
and summarize our findings in the form of practical rec-
ommendations.
Introduction and Background
In the children’s book Amelia Bedelia by Peggy Parish, the
titular maid is presented with a written list of instructions on
what to do around the house of her employers while they are
away (Parish 1963). The instructions tell her to “change the
towels in the green bathroom,” so she cuts them up with a
scissors, transforming their appearance. Instructed to “dust
the furniture,” she scatters dusting powder all over the fur-
niture. Luckily, when the homeowners return, she appeases
them with an expertly-crafted lemon meringue pie.
Although Amelia Bedelia’s misinterpretations make for
humorous situations, for an AI researcher they reflect a
more sobering problem: Will similar misinterpretations oc-
cur when automated robots are given natural-language in-
structions telling them how to behave? And worse, what if
those instructions are ethical guidelines, provided to ensure
that the robots act in a human-like way?
When given a phrase in a written document or other fixed
medium, a large part of how people construct and justify in-
terpretations of that phrase, both internally and publicly, is
through the use of what are called interpretive arguments.
Interpretive arguments, following the general formulation of
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(Sartor et al. 2014), are of the form: “If expression E occurs
in document D, E has a setting of S, and E would fit this
setting of S by having interpretation I, then E ought to be
interpreted as I” (Sartor et al. 2014). Thus understood, ‘in-
terpretive arguments’ are those used to support or attack an
interpretation of a fixed expression within a fixed document.
Although interpretive arguments were first identified in
the context of law to classify the kinds of arguments used
to justify interpretations of phrases in contracts, statutes,
etc. (MacCormick and Summers 1991), they have a much
broader applicability; perhaps for this reason they are see-
ing increased interest in the AI-, logic-, and argumentation-
related literature (Rotolo, Governatori, and Sartor 2015;
Loui 2016; Walton, Sartor, and Macagno 2016; Pereira et
al. 2017; Macagno, Walton, and Sartor 2018; Walton, Sar-
tor, and Macagno 2018). Interpretive arguments are an im-
portant way to determine whether open-textured phrases in
stated rules apply to new scenarios. To use an example from
traffic law (Prakken 2017), consider a rule like “never enter
into a situation where you are impeding traffic.” If a self-
driving car is moving at the speed limit on a one-lane street
with a line of cars behind it wanting to drive faster, is that an
instance of impeding traffic? And what counts as sufficient
justification for an answer to that question?
In that example, the phrase ‘impeding traffic’ is open-
textured (Hart 1961), meaning it refers to a category whose
membership is “highly dependent on context and human
intentions,” where there is an “absence of precise condi-
tions for membership” (Branting 2000). Although open-
textured phrases introduce difficulties that are well-known
(Sanders 1991; Bench-Capon 2012; Franklin 2012; Pereira
et al. 2017; Quandt and Licato 2019), their use is virtually
unavoidable, even in domains as seemingly straightforward
as traffic law (Prakken 2017). In practice, then, settling on
an interpretation of open-textured phrases is done through
argumentation. In the ‘impeding traffic’ case, it might be ar-
gued that a definition of ‘impedement’ requires that the thing
being impeded is lawful or proper, and since the self-driving
car is following the speed limit and only impeding illegal
behavior (speeding), it is therefore not impeding traffic. But
another argument is that since it is normal for cars to drive
a few miles per hour above the speed limit, the behavior of
the self-driving car is impeding normal traffic patterns, the
promotion of which was the intended purpose of the traf-
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fic rule. Both of these arguments are interpretive, and both
might be used to justify interpretations of the open-textured
phrase ‘impeding traffic.’
Open-textured phrases are even more prevalent in ethical
and legal domains. Whether they work fully autonomously
or in human-machine teams, artificial agents given rules
to follow (where those rules may range from international
laws, to company ethical policies, to mission-specific or-
ders) can benefit tremendously by understanding how to use
interpretive reasoning to determine the applicability of open-
textured phrases (Quandt and Licato 2019). For example, the
ACM/IEE-CS Software Engineering Code of Ethics (Gotter-
barn, Miller, and Rogerson 1997) states that software engi-
neers should “[m]oderate the interests of the software engi-
neer, the employer, the client and the users with the public
good.” But the phrase ‘public good’ is highly open-textured,
and human beings may disagree about whether certain plau-
sible actions are in service of the public good. For example,
if a software engineer creates software that destroys all of
the world’s computers, can that be considered in service of
the public good? Indeed, the software engineer might pro-
vide interpretive argument I1 : “Destroying all computers
would allow humanity to return to a state of nature, which
is a good thing.” Such an argument would be quickly dis-
missed by most human reasoners. But on what basis is such
a dismissal warranted? And more importantly for artificial
intelligence researchers: how can interpretive arguments like
I1 be automatically evaluated in a human-like way?
One way to evaluate I1 is by examining its argument-
theoretic properties, e.g. by asking: What is its argument
structure? What are its counterarguments, whether interpre-
tive or not? How strong are its premises, conclusion, and
warrant? It is thus through interpretive arguments and argu-
mentation in general that such disagreements are resolved in
practice, and it is difficult to see how any automated reasoner
faced with ethical or legal problems can act at a human level
without the ability to, at the very least, anticipate the kinds
of interpretive arguments that might be used in support of or
against its actions.
We will refer to systems capable of understanding, gen-
erating, and reasoning over interpretive arguments as au-
tomated interpretive reasoners. Currently we are unaware
of any algorithms to automatically identify, extract, or as-
sess interpretive arguments, much less coherently generate
them. In this paper, we contribute to the advancement of au-
tomated interpretive reasoners in two ways: (1) by creating a
dataset of real-world ethical rules and human-generated sce-
narios designed to elicit interpretive reasoning; and (2) by
qualitatively analyzing this dataset in order to produce rec-
ommendations for automated interpretive reasoners, if they
hope to eventually achieve human-level reasoning in ethical
domains.
Constructing the Scenario Dataset
In order to guide research on automated interpretive rea-
soners, it is helpful to qualitatively analyze real examples
of how human reasoners might react to real-world ethical
rules containing open-textured predicates. At present, how-
ever, no suitable datasets exist. Although there are corpuses
Figure 1: Example Question Set from the Stage 2 Survey,
Generated by a Template
of arguments made by trained legal professionals (e.g., tran-
scripts of US Supreme Court oral arguments), these are not
structured in the sense that interpretive arguments are clearly
stated and distinguished from other text. Our first task, then,
was to construct a dataset that centered around open-textured
terms and scenarios likely to invite diverse interpretive argu-
ments, thus lending itself to an analysis that would benefit
future work on automated interpretive reasoners.
We built such a dataset in three stages, each of which we
detail in this section. In the first stage, we compiled codes
of ethics of various professional organizations, on the as-
sumption that the language they use tends to contain open-
textured phrases likely to invite diverse, competing interpre-
tations. In the second stage, the goal was to collect exam-
ple scenarios. Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) users were
asked to provide scenarios which were either clear instances
of a phrase, clearly not instances of a phrase, or ambiguous.
Finally, in the third stage, participants were presented with
scenarios collected in the second stage and were asked to
rate how well they fit their corresponding phrases, providing
justifications for their interpretations.
Stage 1: Open-textured Phrase Collection
We manually compiled codes of ethics of various profes-
sional organizations, and identified excerpts containing a
phrase that we deemed highly open-textured, on the informal
criterion that the phrase immediately brought to mind com-
peting interpretive arguments. Consider, for example, the
following taken from a code of ethics for architects: “Mem-
bers making public statements on architectural issues shall
disclose when they are being compensated for making such
statements or when they have an economic interest in the is-
sue.” In this excerpt, the phrase “making public statements”
could be interpreted in many ways as to what counts as a
‘public statement.’ We refer to each excerpt as a ‘rule.’ 76
rule-phrase pairs were collected and stored along with meta-
information such as the source document URL and the name
of the profession the code of ethics is written for.
In order to ensure grammatical consistency such that the
collected phrases can be plugged into generic placeholders
within our templates (see survey question templates in Stage
2 and 3), all of the collected phrases were edited such that
they would be present participle phrases and were formatted
to fit grammatically with the survey question format in sub-
sequent stages. This also ensured that the phrases would be
able to describe a category of actions; e.g., the phrase “pub-
lic good” was replaced with “ensuring the public good,” or
“promoting the public good,” depending on which formula-
tion fits the corresponding rule the best.
Stage 2: Scenarios Collection
After collecting the rule-phrase pairs, the next goal was to
collect scenarios that emphasized the open-texturedness of
the phrases. A survey was created using Qualtrics1 and par-
ticipants were recruited through Amazon mTurk. The survey
gave participants question sets, each question set requiring
participants to come up with three scenarios:
• Scenarios that are clear instances of the given phrase.
• Scenarios that are clearly not instances of the given
phrase.
• Borderline scenarios for which it is not clear whether they
are or are not instances of the given phrase.
For each rule-phrase pair, a question set was generated
by plugging in the rule, phrase, and corresponding profes-
sion into a template (see example in Figure 1). All gener-
ated question sets were manually inspected to ensure they
appeared correctly and were grammatically correct.
Each participant in the survey was given up to 2 hours to
complete 5 question sets, each question set generated by a
randomly chosen rule-phrase pair. Participation in the survey
required a US graduate degree, which was enforced using a
filter provided by mTurk. This requirement was introduced
based on the observation from a pilot study that the qual-
ity of responses seemed significantly higher with this filter.
No other requirements were enforced on participants, and
no additional information about the users, demographic or
otherwise, were collected.
After the survey was completed, we reviewed the col-
lected responses, and edited all grammatical and spelling
errors. Responses were removed entirely if they did not de-
scribe scenarios (e.g., if we agreed that the response was just
random words typed in to obtain the participant fee).
1https://www.qualtrics.com
Figure 2: A Question from the Stage 3 Survey
Stage 3: Rating Scenarios
Armed with the curated scenarios from Stage 2, the next
goal was to collect users’ interpretations of how well a sce-
nario can be interpreted as an instance of an open-textured
phrase, along with a justification of that interpretation. A
second online survey was created using Qualtrics. Given a
rule-phrase pair, the corresponding profession, and a sce-
nario from Stage 2, a template was again used to generate
questions.
An example generated question can be seen in Figure 2.
Each question asked the participant to provide a rating, on a
five-point scale, on whether or not the scenario is an instance
of the open-textured phrase. The rule and profession were
also provided for context. The participant is then asked to
justify their rating choice, using no more than two sentences.
Each participant in the survey was given a maximum of 2
hours to complete 20 ratings and justifications. As in Stage
2, participation in the survey required a US graduate degree.
No other participant requirements were enforced, nor was
any other participant data collected.
In our first attempt at deploying Stage 3, some users were
confused by the phrasing of the survey choices. Initially, the
survey used a slightly different wording for the available
choices as follows: “Very clear non-example,” “Somewhat
clear non-example,” “Can’t decide / neither a clear exam-
ple nor a clear non-example,” “Somewhat clear example,”
and “Very clear example.” Some users appeared to assume
that “very clear example” referred to the understandability of
the phrase, rather than its applicability to the scenario. Thus,
they would interpret a scenario as a “very clear example”
when the other participants would rate that same scenario as
a “very clear non-example”.
To filter out such responses, the numerical choices of all
responses were compared, and any answers that differed
from the average of the other answers by more than 3.5
were flagged. The value 3.5 was chosen as it seemed to iso-
late rating-justification pairs that were either given by raters
not understanding the rules, or instances of highly interest-
ing interpretive arguments. All flagged rating-justification
pairs were manually inspected. In some cases, the justifica-
tion provided was good, but simply did not match the rating
selected, so the ratings were corrected to match the justifi-
cation. Editing ratings in such a way was only done in cases
where the justification either explicitly stated a positive in-
terpretation but the numerical interpretation was ‘1’ (very
clear non-example), or explicitly stated a negative interpre-
tation but the numerical interpretation was ‘5’ (very clear
example).
If the flagged responses met our exclusion criteria (to be
described shortly), they were removed. If a particular user
showed up in the flagged responses more than once, the rest
of their non-flagged responses were manually inspected as
well. In some cases, the entire set of responses provided by
individual users had to be removed. This process was re-
peated until all flagged responses were no longer subject to
our edit or removal criteria.
Recall that the primary purpose of this dataset is to pro-
duce a sample of interpretive arguments that can be used
to help guide research into automated interpretive reason-
ers. The people performing interpretations in this study
are likely not trained professionals, and they should not
be expected to produce interpretations in accordance with
the kinds of argumentative schemes common in legal rea-
soning (MacCormick and Summers 1991; Walton, Sartor,
and Macagno 2016; Macagno, Walton, and Sartor 2018;
Walton, Sartor, and Macagno 2018). But automated inter-
pretive reasoners may need to anticipate the kinds of in-
terpretive arguments given and accepted by those not spe-
cially trained; thus, what might appear to be poor argu-
ments, even unwarranted assertions, must be allowed in this
dataset. With that in mind, the exclusion criteria for rating-
justification pairs was loose: they were excluded only if
all of our team members agreed the raters were acting in
bad faith (e.g., the justification text appeared to be random
or copy-pasted words, or comments / complaints about the
study). Such responses were removed.
This left a few survey questions with less than three user-
submitted responses, so Stage 3 was repeated on mTurk, this
time with the descriptions of each numerical choice updated
to include the phrase, as in Figure 2. These results were com-
bined with the existing curated results, and the above proce-
dure for flagging rating-justification pairs was then repeated
to identify and remove bad faith responses.
Label Count Average Rating Average Stdev
RG 76 3.223 0.851
Mul 64 3.151 0.869
NA 49 2.897 0.869
AN 34 3.105 0.831
Phr 8 3.673 0.527
No label 439 3.042 0.879
Table 1: Qualitative Labels Added to Scenarios
Dataset Properties
To summarize the structure of the final dataset: a rule-phrase
pair consists of a “rule” taken from a real-world code of
ethics, and an open-textured phrase taken from that rule.
Each rule-phrase pair contains multiple scenarios, where
each scenario is a description of an action which may or may
not be an instance of the phrase. Each scenario has a number
of rating-justification pairs, which argue for the applicability
or inapplicability of the phrase to the scenario. The rating is
a numerical value from 1 (“very clear non-example”) to 5
(“very clear example”), whereas the justification is an argu-
ment for why the rating is appropriate.
The final published dataset contains 76 rule-phrase pairs
and 636 scenario descriptions. There were 2425 rating-
justification pairs. To understand the way in which the rat-
ings are distributed, we calculated Krippendorff’s α (Krip-
pendorff 2004), using the variant for arbitrary distance met-
rics, any number of observers, and potentially missing data.2
Using the ordinal distance metric, α = 0.296, suggesting
that there is a non-trivial amount of disagreement between
raters. Indeed, somewhat of a wide variation in the numeri-
cal ratings of a given scenario is expected and desired, given
our goals.
Qualitative Analysis
Our dataset was constructed to produce a wide variety of
scenarios and interpretive arguments to qualitatively ana-
lyze. After analysis, several patterns emerged that have in-
teresting implications for future work on automated interpre-
tive reasoners, or for computational cognitive models which
hope to model interpretive reasoning. In this section we sum-
marize our findings, along with lessons learned.
It should be noted that because this is an initial ex-
ploratory work, the observations in this section should be
considered suggestions of future directions of research into
automated interpretive reasoners, rather than conclusive ev-
idence of patterns.
Scenario Labels
The scenarios were manually annotated with features of po-
tential interest. After an initial inspection of the responses
from Stage 2, features were selected if the authors suspected
2A clear description of this variant is available at
http://web.asc.upenn.edu/usr/krippendorff/
mwebreliability5.pdf.
that they would identify scenarios likely to affect ratings in
some significant way. The features, along with their abbre-
viations and criteria, are as follows:
• Phrase repeated (Phr) - The scenario description repeats
the provided phrase, or important key words from it, in
such a way that points to a desired interpretation of the
phrase. For example, if the phrase were “serving the pub-
lic good,” the scenario “the professor contributed to the
public good by doing honest research” would be flagged.
This does not include uses of the provided phrase or its
key words if they are not used to describe the action.
For example, given the phrase “acting with the highest
integrity”, the scenario “the professional launched an in-
vestigation into a colleague who is widely regarded to
act with the highest integrity” would not be flagged, be-
cause the repeated phrase does not describe the action per-
formed (the launching of an investigation).
• No action by actor (NA) - The scenario description does
not describe an action performed specifically by the ac-
tor the rule is designed to cover, e.g. “a teacher is guilty
of abuse”. If there is an action, it is either performed by
someone else, the action is described using passive voice,
or the actor is the object of the action. Non-actions such as
“the architect never swims” would be labeled. In contrast,
“the architect refuses to swim” is considered an action.
Also note that the actor need not necessarily be an indi-
vidual; in “the architect’s firm does X,” the firm still falls
under the code of ethics of architects. Even if it is strongly
implied who the actor is, the actor needs to be explicitly
stated: “books are loaned to the public” in the ‘library’
code of ethics would be labeled.
• Action by non-actor (AN) - An action is described that
is either performed by someone other than the actor the
rule is designed to cover, or an action is described using
passive voice (“the teacher receives information”). This
includes cases where the passive action is merely pro-
vided as context to the primary action, e.g. “the teacher
receives information about the student, and after receiv-
ing this info, performs action X”. It’s possible a scenario
to have both this label and NA, if the only action described
is not performed by the actor.
• Multiple actions by main actor (Mul) - The scenario
description describes multiple actions by the actor the rule
is designed to cover. If additional actions are described but
there is only one action performed by the primary actor,
this label does not apply.
• Reason given (RG) - The scenario description provides a
reason or intention behind the action, e.g. “X does Y so
that Z”, “X does Y in order to Z”, etc. Must explicitly link
to the reason in a causal way, e.g. “the architect destroys
old decrepit buildings and replaces them” would not be la-
beled; but “the architect destroys old decrepit buildings so
he can replace them” would. “The professor uses mesh for
his hammock” is not labeled because “for his hammock”
is more of a description rather than an intention.
Table 1 lists these labels along with their frequencies, aver-
age ratings, and the average standard deviations of the rat-
ings (as calculated within each scenario). Figure 3 shows the
distribution of individual ratings within scenarios with each
label. Given each label l and numerical rating value n, the
number of times that a rating of n was assigned to a scenario
labeled with l was divided by the total number of ratings of
a scenario labeled with l. The resulting value is the y-axis in
Figure 3. For comparison, the distribution of ratings within
scenarios that received no labels is also shown. A few obser-
vations can be made:
• The RG and Phr labels seem to have the largest per-
centage of ratings at the extremes; respectively, they have
67% and 79% of their ratings as ‘1’ or ‘5,’ as opposed
to 53% for scenarios with no annotations. In RG cases,
we suspect this is because explaining the intention be-
hind an action makes it easier to empathize with an actor
(Dennett 1989). In Phr cases, repeating parts of the tar-
get phrase often appeared with explicit modifiers (e.g., if
the phrase were “behaving kindly,” a scenario description
might be “the scientist treated his colleague unkindly,”
nakedly suggesting an intended interpretation).
• Phr had the lowest standard deviations of within-scenario
ratings, suggesting that the repeating of a phrase within
the scenario description does indeed encourage less di-
versity in interpretations.
• AN had the lowest percentage of ratings at extremes
(44%). This may reflect confusion by the raters on which
action to interpret. For example, in the scenario “the doc-
tor was not paid as much as her colleagues,” it may be
unclear whether which action the target phrase is being
applied to: that of the unnamed individual or group which
decides how much the doctor is paid, or some unstated
action of the doctor that may be responsible for the pay
disparity.
Figure 3: Within-label distribution of individual ratings of
scenarios, grouped and normalized by qualitative scenario
label (x-axis).
Phrase Labels
In order to determine whether the phrases affected had some
effect on the scenarios or their interpretations, we also anno-
tated the phrases with the following labels:
Figure 4: Within-label distribution of individual ratings,
grouped and normalized by qualitative phrase label (x-axis).
Label Count Average Rating Average Stdev
N 11 2.808 0.915
A 3 2.614 0.971
H 5 2.853 0.704
P 8 3.333 0.861
No label 52 3.106 0.844
Table 2: Qualitative Labels Added to Phrases
• Negative actions (N) - The actions which are typical in-
stances of the phrase are generally, on the surface, uneth-
ical behaviors. E.g., ‘causing disrepute,’ ‘making unwar-
ranted statements,’ ‘acting against public interest,’ etc.
• Absence actions (A) - The phrase is primarily defined as
an absence of an action, or acting against an action, rather
than an action itself. E.g., ‘acting against public interest,’
‘not participating,’ etc. Phrases such as “engaging in mis-
conduct” were not annotated with this label, as ‘miscon-
duct’ is a distinct type of action rather than merely the
absence of proper conduct.
• Having (H) - Phrase starts with the word ‘having.’
• Public (P) - Phrase contains the word ‘public.’ Such
phrases seem particularly inviting of a broad variety of
interpretations, since so many actions can be justified as
being in service of the ‘public good.’
The average ratings and standard deviations of ratings
within-scenario for all scenarios created under each anno-
tated label are listed in Table 2. Figure 4 shows the distri-
bution of individual ratings for all ratings of scenarios un-
der each label type. Given each phrase label l and numer-
ical rating value n, the number of times that a rating of n
was assigned to a phrase-scenario pair where the phrase was
labeled with l was divided by the total number of ratings
assigned to a phrase-scenario where the phrase was labeled
with l. The resulting value is the y-axis in Figure 4.
In Figure 4 it is clear that phrases annotated with N and
A have relatively high occurrences of ‘1’ ratings. Recall that
when the scenarios were created in Stage 2, approximately
one-third of them were written with the intent to be inter-
preted as clear non-instances of their corresponding phrases.
If the phrase labels N and A simply pick out scenarios that
were intended to be clear non-instances, this would explain
the high occurrence of ‘1’ ratings. But this is not the case:
phrases annotated with N or A were written with the intent
to be clear non-instances 38.7% of the time, as compared to
33.0% for phrases without those labels. Instead, it may be
the case that N and A phrases have a negative biasing effect
on interpretations (one which sentiment-based automated in-
terpretive reasoners should watch out for). Another possible
explanation is that the additional cognitive load of interpret-
ing a phrase describing the negation or absence of an action
may have led to more diversity in interpretive arguments (in-
deed, the within-scenario standard deviation of ratings was
higher for phrases N and A).
Our initial suspicion was that H phrases would produce
scenarios which were unclear about actions in some way.
For example, the phrase “having substantial information”
describes a state or property rather than an action, and thus
scenarios generated when prompted with such phrases may
be more likely to describe actions by non-actors (AN), or
perhaps fail to describe actions at all (NA). H phrases did
produce the lowest standard deviation of ratings within-
scenarios, and the highest number of ‘3’ scores, when com-
pared to other phrase labels. However, when determining the
correlations between each phrase label and scenario label, no
significant correlations were found.
Individual Case Analysis
Analysis of individual cases is a useful research methodol-
ogy for exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory works (Yin
1981) as it deals with information in a complex, holistic,
process-oriented, and particularistic way that is reflective of
reality (Wilson 1979). In this section, we analyze individual
responses by trying to answer three questions: (1) What kind
of reasoning could have been used to generate this response?
(2) Can current state-of-the-art AI carry out this kind of rea-
soning? And (3) if not, which capabilities does AI need, and
which questions must AI-related researchers answer, before
it can?
Details of Questionable Relevance
Perhaps because the scenario descriptions were required to
be no more than two sentences, raters in Stage 3 may have
assumed that any details included in the scenario description
must be important. Any details which would normally be
of questionable relevance therefore may have a heightened
effect in this task, making their effect easier to identify. E.g.:
Rule: To perform all professional work in a manner
that merits full confidence and trust; to be conservative
in estimates, reports, and testimony, especially if these
are related to the promotion of a business enterprise or
the protection of the public interest.
Phrase: Protecting the public interest
Scenario: The chemist filled out his tax report.
Ratings / Justifications:
1. (Rating 1) The tax report is irrelevant to the public
interest.
2. (Rating 5) Filing taxes is a clear example of protect-
ing the public interest because taxes are considered
public funds.
The action of filling out a tax report appears on the sur-
face to be completely outside of the domain described by the
phrase or the rule and its associated profession (chemistry).
Statistically calculating pre-existing associations between
this action and domain, as might be done by many currently
popular machine learning approaches, would likely result in
low values. But interpretive reasoning is more than reason-
ing about pre-existing associations; it also requires reason-
ing about possible connections which can be supported by
interpretive arguments. The first rater was not able to find
such a connection, whereas the second rater was: taxes are a
type of public funds, public funds are vital to the public in-
terest; therefore, filling out taxes protects the public interest.
A similar example comes from the code of ethics for Mas-
sage Therapists:
Rule: The Massage Therapist shall project a profes-
sional image and uphold the highest standards of pro-
fessionalism.
Phrase: Projecting a professional image
Scenario: The massage therapist brushes her teeth ev-
ery morning.
Ratings / Justifications:
1. (Rating 5) A simple [sic] but an example of main-
taining a professional image by hygiene.
2. (Rating 4) While trivial, the therapist brushing her
teeth is an example of projecting a professional im-
age. It is only a “somewhat clear” example because
it is trivial and probably not what the rule is intended
to cover.
3. (Rating 5) Given that massage is the health and well-
ness industry, clean teeth do help project a profes-
sional image.
4. (Rating 1) Scenario act should be performed any-
way.
Raters 1 to 3 note that the act of brushing one’s teeth seems
trivial, but all three conclude it is not entirely irrelevant to
projecting a professional image. Rater 4 disagrees, specifi-
cally because the act described in the scenario is one that is
already a normal everyday expectation of a massage ther-
apist. But which conclusion is more warranted from the
premise that brushing one’s teeth is an everyday expected
task: that brushing one’s teeth is an instance of projecting a
professional image that only minimally contributes to it, or
that it is not an instance at all?
The ability to answer such questions might be expected
of an agent capable of evaluating interpretive arguments,
whether artificial or human. It might be the case that an arti-
ficial interpretive reasoner, being necessarily bound by time
limitations, might be hard-coded with a preference for in-
terpretations that maximize practical consequence. In such a
case, what sort of algorithm would allow a massage therapy-
bot to calculate the practical consequence of brushing its
teeth (or the equivalent act for robots)?
Omission of Details
As opposed to introducing irrelevant or misleading details,
another strategy that invited disagreeing interpretations was
the omission of potentially relevant details in scenario de-
scriptions. For example:
Rule: Employers should provide [chemical profes-
sionals] with a safe, congenial working environment,
fair compensation, opportunities for advancement, and
properly acknowledge their scientific contributions.
Phrase: Providing fair compensation
Scenario: The chemical professional receives higher
wage compared to colleagues in similar roles.
Ratings / Justifications:
1. (Rating 1) People in similar roles should receive
similar wage compensation
2. (Rating 5) Better than market compensation is more
than fair.
3. (Rating 1) Since one person is receiving higher
wages than colleagues in a comparable position, this
is inconsistent with the concept of providing fair
compensation because similarly qualified individu-
als are not being treated similarly.
In this case, the reasons for the wage disparity are not spec-
ified, only that the chemical professional and colleagues are
in “similar roles.” Raters 1 and 3 interpret the action of ‘pro-
viding fair compensation’ as encompassing fair treatment
of all workers, whereas the second rater interprets a higher
salary than colleagues as being “more than fair” for the in-
dividual receiving the higher salary.
In cases where the scenario description is extremely short
and sparse on details, raters often had to draw on their own
background knowledge to fill in the details:
Rule: Model the trustworthiness of God in leader-
ship to encourage and develop trustworthiness in oth-
ers. Use power and influence prudently and humbly.
Foster loyalty. Demonstrate a commitment to the well-
being of the entire congregation.
Phrase: Committing to the entire congregation’s well-
being
Scenario: The pastor cleans the altar.
Ratings / Justifications:
1. (Rating 5) While it appears to be a menial task, the
pastor’s cleaning the altar himself is a demonstra-
tion of commitment to the well-being of his or her
congregation.
2. (Rating 1) The altar is only used by those that offici-
ate at the service. Most of the congregation is in the
audience and are not affected by the altar’s cleanli-
ness.
In both Stages 2 and 3, mTurk participants were shown
the profession type whose code of ethics the rule was from.
In the above example, the profession was “pastor,” and the
interpretations here show that the raters drew heavily from
their own preconceptions of the normal operations of a pas-
tor’s job. In the first case, the rater noticed that the pastor
cleaned the altar himself (presumably as opposed to hav-
ing another clean it). In the second, the rater points out that
the altar is not normally used by most of the congregation.
Although these two interpretations have entirely opposite
numerical ratings, they both start by identifying the signif-
icance of the action of cleaning the altar within the context
of the pastor’s normal duties. Automated interpretive reason-
ers, then, must rely on a significant amount of background
knowledge (Quandt and Licato 2019).
Contrarian Arguments
A third common cause of disagreement in interpretive argu-
ments may best be described as a desire to be contrarian, i.e.,
by providing a non-standard interpretation that, whether in-
tentionally or not, goes against the majority opinion (recall
the example argument I1). Generating contrarian arguments
requires the ability to anticipate the common or expected
reaction to a scenario, and then to argue for the opposite
reaction (both of which are abilities seemingly beyond the
state-of-the-art of current AI). Reasons for such a behavior
may vary—perhaps the participant is bored, wants to exer-
cise creative reasoning, may want to be intentionally mali-
cious, etc.—but in the context of group decision-making, the
occasional desire to stand against majority opinions (some-
times called “playing devil’s advocate”) can prove beneficial
for the group overall (Licato and Marji 2018).
Intentional contrarianism can have real world conse-
quences. A malicious individual might try to convince an
artificial reasoner that some non-standard interpretation of a
phrase in an ethical rule is correct. It is therefore worthwhile
for automated interpretive reasoning research to understand
how to detect contrarian interpretive arguments, or at least
determine whether a typical human audience would consider
them contrarian. Consider the following example:
Rule: A veterinarian shall uphold the standards of pro-
fessionalism, be honest in all professional interactions,
and report veterinarians who are deficient in character
or competence to the appropriate entities.
Phrase: Having deficient character
Scenario: The veterinarian beats a dog in his kennel
who is being inappropriately loud or violent.
Ratings / Justifications:
1. (Rating 1) A veterinarian beating a dog seems to
be the definition of unprofessional, clearly shows a
character deficiency but has nothing to do with the
requirement to “report veterinarians who are defi-
cient in character or competence to the appropriate
entities.” If one element of a conjunction is false
then so is the conjunction.
2. (Remaining 3 ratings were ‘5’)
The first rater’s interpretation interprets wording in the rule
outside of the phrase to limit its scope (although it references
a logical conjunction, the source of which is difficult to re-
construct). Such a practice is not uncommon in legal reason-
ing, but was uncommon in this dataset, likely because the
questions in Stage 3 asked participants to use the phrase to
determine interpretations while merely considering the rule.
Rater 1 may not intentionally have been acting in an inten-
tionally contrarian role, but nevertheless plays the role. In
any case, the rater likely recognized that their interpretation
was non-standard, as they prefaced their argument with a
sort of disclaimer statement acknowledging what they antic-
ipate the expected interpretation to be.
Conclusion
We set out to curate a collection of interpretative arguments
and interesting scenarios, in order to better understand what
problems might be faced by research into automated inter-
pretive reasoners. Our dataset enables the inspection of sce-
narios and interpretations, presented in a structured way (as
compared to, e.g., US Supreme Court transcripts). These
scenarios are simple enough that it is plausible for current AI
to use them as short-term goals for automated interpretive
reasoners, yet complex enough that they invite a diversity
of interpretive arguments and go beyond mere classification
problems.
Although the interpretations collected can benefit from
follow-up studies, in their current state they are useful for
qualitative and individual case analyses, in order to guide
future research on what an automated interpretive reasoner
will need in order to interpret ethical rules. Our analysis re-
vealed issues that automated interpretive reasons need to ad-
dress, and we encourage researchers to use them as a starting
point. These issues include contrarian arguments, and pat-
terns such as irrelevant or missing details that lead to wildly
diverging interpretations. In order to further research in this
area, our full dataset and implementation code will be made
available upon publication.
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